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Abstract. Current challenges on the markets cause companies to in-
teract with one another and strive after becoming members of virtual
organizations assuming that in doing so they can achieve sustainable com-
petitiveness and remain successful despite increased competition. This
new openness has strong implications and poses intense demands on
organizations’ security systems. In this paper we present architectural
considerations and our concept of a security infrastructure to cope with
these challenges. The presented approach aims at minimizing the lead-
time before usage of external services can start by employing a security
intermediary for mediation purposes.
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1 Introduction and Motivation
Today’s companies are facing strong challenges and pressure in the markets: the
economic crisis demanded maximum ﬂexibility to survive and increased compe-
tition due to the globalization requires shorter innovation cycles and continuous
improvement of products and value creation processes. More and more compa-
nies are realizing that their ways of doing business have to be advanced as they
can no longer solely trade as fully self-contained actors. Many of them are begin-
ning to reconsider their entrenched business structures and aim for collaborative
value chains and ﬂexible cross company business network structures to perform
future business with anybody, anywhere, anytime regardless of underlying infor-
mation technology infrastructures [13]. Surveys by [3] or [10] back this trend and
predict a signiﬁcant increase of virtual organizations (VOs) and eCollaboration
in the forthcoming years.
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Especially information and communication technology (ICT) has repeatedly
been identiﬁed as the most critical success factor for eﬃciently running collab-
orative projects [7], [16]. The need for tight integration of cross-organizational
value chains is still rapidly increasing and organizations’ boundaries are becom-
ing more ﬂuid and permeable.
This new openness to speedily establish VOs and the associated rapid but tight
integration of IT systems with partnering organizations has strong implications
and poses intense demands on organizations’ security systems. Flexible security
measures and infrastructures to enforce them have to be in place. Security of the
company’s IT properties has to be guaranteed at all times even if the number
and the identities of people authorized to access single services vary frequently
and swiftly. The more ﬂexible and rapid an organization wants to join a virtual
business network, the more eﬀective and powerful its security infrastructure in
general and its access control schemes in particular must be. In this paper we
therefore present our fundamental considerations regarding several architectural
alternatives for developing a ﬂexible access control infrastructure for networked
enterprises, particularly tailored to rapid but still reliable and trustworthy link-
age of single services from a pool of service candidates. We assume the following
cooperation model: A VO is composed of a set of partnering organizations each
oﬀering a set of services that contribute to a single goal common to all collabo-
ration partners. The goal is deﬁned through a business process model in which
each task either refers to a service or a human task performed by a collaboration
partner. Services are either statically deﬁned (i.e. pre-assigned at collaboration
design time) which requires non-negligible start-up eﬀorts such as searching and
opting for appropriate service providers out of a pool of several candidates and
establish relationships with him by some means or other. Or services are dynam-
ically selected at the latest possible time, i.e. at service invocation time which is
roughly sketched in Fig. 1.
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Fig. 1. Ideal service-oriented eCollaboration
For that reason we consider a service broker reasonable and essential. In con-
trast to previous pure service registry approaches, our service broker is not lim-
ited to service registration functionality but introduces an additional layer of
indirection and mediation. The service broker can provide standardized inter-
faces for diﬀerent kinds of services (e.g. a travel booking services) and service
providers (e.g. travel companies) register their service instance for a given type
of service. Several authors such as [8], [9] and our initial prototype proved the
feasibility of this approach.
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In Chapter 2 we present
the fundamental security functions for ﬂexible service-oriented VOs from dif-
ferent perspectives. Subsequently, Chapter 3 introduces our approach to tackle
the particular security requirements in short-term business networks in more de-
tail and lay out some preliminary implementation considerations in Chapter 4.
Chapter 5 provides information on related work and similar approaches before
we draw some conclusions and identify future work in the concluding Chapter 6.
2 Security Functions and Implications
We ﬁrst want to exemplify the basic security requirements our approach is gov-
erned by. As a basic non-security principle for our proposed security infrastruc-
ture we try to get along with as little need for adaption as possible at both client
and service provider side. We aim at relieving both from performing extensive
eﬀorts before they can beneﬁt from the newly gained ﬂexibility to rapidly oﬀer
existing services to new customers and embed these into their applications.
2.1 Fundamental Security Functions
The ﬂexibility gained from our understanding of VOs strengthens the need for
a security infrastructure that is highly reliable and adaptive at the same time.
Appropriate security and access control mechanisms in particular are required
to ensure that only authorized actors can invoke supporting service while the
business process ﬂows from one activity to the next.
In more detail, the following security functions are essential for secure VOs:
Usually users ﬁrst name their claimed identity, termed identification. Closely
connected is authentication during which the system validates the user’s claimed
identity. Typically both steps precede access control which aims at preventing
unauthorized use of a resource as well as use of resources in an unauthorized
manner. To perform reasonable access control, resource owners ﬁrst have to
specify and allocate access rights to potential users, termed authorization. In
many cases access rights are directly assigned to user identities but further more
elaborate approaches for specifying access rights based on diﬀerent criteria such
as role membership or various attributes of users are well-engineered[18]. These
more powerful approaches partially permit anonymization or pseudonymization,
i.e. service usage without disclosing the user’s authentic identity. During the
interaction of users with resources and services, diﬀerent communication secu-
rity functions such as encryption and digital signature arise to ensure security
aims such as conﬁdentiality and integrity. Last but not least auditing allows for
recording and reviewing all security-related events.
2.2 Diﬀerent Perspectives: End User, Service Provider, Broker
Diﬀerent stakeholders in VOs have diﬀerent demands concerning security func-
tions. We therefore brieﬂy sketch the perspectives of the most important actors.
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End users are usually mainly interested in uncomplicated utilization of re-
quired services. If conﬁdential data is transfered communication security func-
tions are inquired, whereas identiﬁcation is only considered important if it bears
advantages such as enhanced or eased functionality due to personalization.
Anonymization or pseudonymization might be of interest if users do not want to
disclose their authentic identity to access a particular resource.
Service providers mainly focus on authorization, access control and auditing
to govern access to their resources and track potential violations. They might
be interested in validated identities of their users for accounting purposes and
in communication security functions in case they oﬀer conﬁdential information.
User anonymization/pseudonymization is usually rather irrelevant.
Service Brokers are trying to please both, users and SPs. Depending on the
degree of trust both parties put in one another, service brokers may mediate for
example between user’s demand for anonymization and service providers’ request
for authentic user identities for billing purposes.
2.3 Interim Implications
From our deﬁnition of dynamic service-oriented eCollaboration can easily be
deduced that identity-based authorization and access control does not ﬁt our
needs as they imply service providers to know all potential service requesters
in advance. If service requesters are permitted access to single services if they
can prove their identity – as it is common nowadays – the results are users
holding separate accounts at each service provider. Indeed, single-Sign-On (SSO)
solutions such as for example Shibboleth1, OpenID2 or Cardspace3 alleviate the
problem, still they do not represent fully applicable solutions mainly due to
their limitation to services requiring a web browsers as user interface. If services
are considered in a broader sense, including modern (SOAP-based) web services
as well as legacy applications made available either way, other access control
approaches such as role- (Rbac) and attribute-based access control (Abac)[18]
in particular are far more eligible. These approaches introduce an additional
layer of indirection between individual users and their access rights and thereby
allow for more ﬂexible and dynamic deﬁnition of access control policies. More
generally spoken, identiﬁcation becomes less important for the beneﬁt of identity-
independent authorization and access control.
3 Approaching Flexible Access Control for VOs
This chapter introduces the system architecture of the Spike4 access control
infrastructure and the conceptual model behind in more detail. Our approach
allows for dynamic service selection at collaboration run-time and particularly
1 http://shibboleth.internet2.edu/
2 http://openid.net/
3 http://www.microsoft.com/windows/products/winfamily/cardspace
4 http://www.spike-project.eu/
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considers access control as the most relevant security function in dynamic service-
oriented VOs.
3.1 Architectural Alternatives
The most popular approaches to embed security modules into distributed sys-
tems are depicted in Fig. 2 and brieﬂy outlined below. Typically, security mod-
ules have to be implemented on both client- and server-side, yet both parties do
not necessarily have to decide on the same architectural alternative.
Middleware
Business Logic
Security Module
(a) Embedded into
the Application
Middleware
Security Module
Business Logic
(b) Security in the
Middleware
Middleware
Security Module
Business Logic
(c) Security as In-
frastructure
Middleware
Enc
Business Logic
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(d) Security as a
Service
Fig. 2. Architectural Alternatives for Implementing Security
Security embedded into the Application. Fig. 2(a) depicts the concept of
security components integrated into each and every application. Developers of ser-
vices and clients have to extend the business logic of service and client respectively
by additional security functionality which has to be invoked explicitly. As a result,
security functionality is strongly interlinked with the business logic making both
potentially more complex, hard to maintain and hard to test for correctness. In
addition, interlinkage of business and security functionality might complicate ser-
vice usage for potential customers. Developers at client- and service-side have to
be expert in both, business logic of the service and security issues. If qualiﬁed de-
velopers are available this approach can provide superior performance due to the
direct API communication between business and security logic.
This architectural alternative imposes further disadvantages such as poor scal-
ability and reusability of both, business and security functionality which applies
to service providers as well as to service requesters. Most notably, the security
modules of service clients have to be particularly tailored to a single service
instance rendering this approach cumbersome for the kind of dynamic eCollab-
oration we aim for.
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Security in the Middleware. In contrast to the embedded security approach,
security components as part of the middleware (Fig. 2(b)) allow for clear sep-
aration of business and security logic. Considering that in most cases services
are not operated stand-alone but are deployed into some runtime environment
or middleware, this approach seems plausible without causing additional com-
plexity. The approach enables business experts to take care of new business logic
without considering security while security can be added in a second step by
security experts, which in turn do not have to crasp every detail of the busi-
ness logic. Thus the security in the middleware approach enables implicit and
conﬁgurable integration of security.
While this approach apparently meets the situation at service provider side,
it might be diﬀerent for potential service requesters. Security components in the
middleware are only feasible for them if the service client is running within some
middleware which might be the case for example if the service interface at client
side is integrated into some web application deployed to some application server.
Still in many cases external services are integrated into stand-alone applications
rendering the security in the middleware approach mainly feasible for service
providers, not necessarily for service requesters.
Security as Infrastructure. The Security as infrastructure approach (Fig.
2(c)) is quite similar to security in the middleware. While both allow for separa-
tion of business and security logic, this approach goes one step further regarding
positioning of the security modules. Instead of providing the security modules
as part of the middleware, security nodes are freely deployed between service im-
plementation and service client. Usage of the external security nodes is typically
conﬁgured at the network routing layer. In comparison to other alternatives, this
approach does not only decouple security from the business logic but both purely
communicate by means of message exchanges, i.e. the security components in-
tercepts messages from and to particular services and clients. Usually neither
service nor client notice the existence of the security modules in between im-
plying that security functions are utilized implicitly making it suitable for both
service providers and service requesters.
It must be mentioned that this approach imposes severe security implications
if applied faulty. While it might be reasonable to provide services without any se-
curity functionality within the own company’s frontiers for example for simplicity
and performance reasons, it has to be guaranteed that all service communication
with external organizations implicitly passes the security node. However, if ap-
plied correctly, this approach provides maximum ﬂexibility and great reusability
and extensibility. In contrast to security in the middleware it is even applicable
to stand-alone services and allows deﬁning appropriate security conﬁgurations
and security credentials depending on sources and targets of messages.
Security as a Service (SaaS). Security as a Service (Fig. 2(d)) is regularly
proposed as the most promising approach for realizing security functions espe-
cially in SOAs. The common promise is that neither service client nor service
provider have to pay attention to security components but can solely focus on
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business logic. Security functionality is provided by distributed security compo-
nents operated by various providers in the ‘cloud’ and is implicitly integrated
into communication between service requester and service provider. Only rarely
a clear usage scenario that includes integration and allocation of distributed se-
curity components is explained. In our opinion issues such as sequence of and
orchestration control over diﬀerent security services are not yet considered sat-
isfactory and certain security functions such as encryption or signature can not
be provided by external parties in a reasonable way.
As a result we do not consider security as a service – at least in its currently
prevalent denotation – a well-engineered and mature architectural alternative.
Rather its reasonable and practicable sub-concepts are already known from
and implemented in security in the middleware and security as infrastructure
approaches.
3.2 Conceptual Model
The Spike approach clearly separates between communication security on the
one hand and identiﬁcation, authentication, authorization and access control
on the other hand. This work clearly focuses on the latter. To meet the general
requirements of minimum initial adjustment eﬀorts shortly addressed in Chapter
2, we aim at establishing as much functionality as possible neither at the client
nor at the service but as part of the infrastructure in between. The conceptual
model of our proposed ﬂexible access control infrastructure for service-oriented
VOs can be derived from Fig. 3 and is based on the security as infrastructure
approach. The main actors are users, service providers (SPs), identity providers
(IdPs) and the service broker acting as a security intermediary at the same time.
A user does not invoke services directly but needs some client application to
do so. For the sake of simplicity and because the client application only provides
technical means to employ given services, we do no distinguish between both. In
our scenario, a user demands a given business functionality and does neither pay
attention to the technical realization nor does she pay attention to the chosen
service provider as long as it performs reliably.
Service providers aim at attracting as many service users as possible. There-
fore, their rationale is not on shielding their services from unknown users but
rather on ensuring that the unknown users conﬁrm to their conditions for service
usage. As a result, service providers are not primarily interested in the identity
of service requesters but in further attributes e.g. for billing purposes. For that
reason they may deﬁne the access policy for their services based on security
tokens or attributes potential users have to hold and exhibit to gain access.
We assume that service users manage their proﬁle at some identity provider.
The proﬁle or ‘digital identity’ consists of all attributes, security and access
tokens the user holds. This is an established concept proven by several imple-
mentations such as Shibboleth, OpenID or Cardspace.
Furthermore, we assume that service requesters try to access new services
of previously unacquainted service providers frequently and rapidly which is
why an intermediate service broker seems reasonable. In addition to its service
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selection and mediation functionality, we employ it as a security intermediary.
Otherwise dynamic selection of appropriate service instances by a service broker
was only possible if all service candidates had the same security policy and
therefore required the same security credentials for successful access control. On
the contrary, our security intermediary may complement service requests by
additional security tokens and mediate between several formats.
The overall service invocation procedure is as follows: For any kind of available
service the security broker provides a generic interface for which service providers
register their particular implementation. Client applications are built against
the service broker interfaces. For invoking a particular service capability, a user
dispatches a service request message to the broker. The service broker selects
an appropriate service instance from the pool of registered services before the
security and access policy of the chosen service is analyzed to extract required
‘access tokens’ for that service. These tokens are requested from the user’s IdP,
are attached to the service request which is ﬁnally dispatched to the selected
service instance. The service instance checks the obtained security token and,
based on the result, access is approved or denied.
3.3 Proposed System Architecture
Fig. 3 sketches the proposed Spike security architecture which focuses on en-
abling ﬂexible access control in particular. We positioned security components at
ﬁve locations distributed across the diﬀerent parties. Required preparatory work
that has to be completed before the access control infrastructure can be em-
ployed is narrowed down to basically three preconditions: (1) service users hold
their attributes and access tokens at some freely chosen IdP (2) a service bro-
ker publishes an interface description for the inquired service (3) one or several
service providers registere their service implementation at the service broker.
A service request, constructed in a way to match the service interface oﬀered
by the service broker, originates from the user’s client application. The outbound
security component (No. 1 in Fig. 3) complements the message by information
on the user’s IdP, i.e its address and an access token to gain access to the user’s
proﬁle. Potentially further communication security mechanisms as deﬁned in
XORService Broker
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Fig. 3. Proposed Architecture
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the service’s interface description can likewise be considered by the outbound
security module at client side.
The inbound security module at the service broker (No. 2 in Fig. 3), i.e. Spike
platform side, extracts the information on the user’s IdP and the access token
from the service request. As a next step, an appropriate service instance for the
inquired service functionality is selected from the pool of registered services.
The outbound security module (No. 4 in Fig. 3) retrieves and analyzes the
security and access control policy of that service to ﬁnd out about alternative
access tokens or attribute sets that are required to gain access to the selected ser-
vice instance. It tries to fetch required credentials from the user’s IdP leveraging
the access token transferred by the user. In case of the user not holding one of the
access tokens deﬁned in the security policy of the service, the process is aborted.
No. 3 in Fig. 3 depicts the security module at IdP side that protects the user’s
proﬁle from illegitimate access. As a ﬁnal step the outbound security module at
service broker side enriches the service request by the security tokens received
from the user’s IdP and forwards the request to the selected service provider.
Further security mechanisms such as encryption can likewise be applied here.
Finally, the inbound security module at service provider side (No. 5 in Fig. 3)
checks the incoming request for existence and validity of requested security to-
kens. If the check is successfully, access to the service is granted.
As can be seen from the descriptions above, we built the Spike approach
regarding separation and distribution of individual security components within
the architecture in conformance with the XACML [19] and ISO10181-3 [1] stan-
dards. The client represents the access requester or initiator while the service
instance represents the target or resource. The IdP conforms to the functions
of the policy information point (PIP). The policy enforcement point (PEP) or
access control enforcement function (AEF) is provided by the service instance
inbound security module. Our current design assumes that the access control
decision purely depends on the availability of some security token in the service
request. However, depending on the implementation of the Spike security infras-
tructure, the policy decision point (PDP)/access control decision function (ADF)
can be performed by the outbound security module of the service broker or the
inbound security module of the service instance, respectively. Finally, the policy
administration point (PAP) does not exist as a single component but, following
the idea of the WS-Security standards, rather each service instance is capable of
providing its security policy in a machine-readable form as part of its interface
description.
4 Implementation Considerations
For the evaluation of our security and access control infrastructure we are cur-
rently in the process of detailing all individual components and building a proto-
type which is going to be tested within the Spike project. A lively open source
community provides numerous individual software components we can reuse and
base our implementation upon.
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An Enterprise Service Bus (ESB) oﬀers many message transformation and
mediation functionalities required by our service broker component. The JBI
speciﬁcation [22] marked an important step towards a common understanding
of the term ESB and currently several rather mature open-source implementa-
tions of that standard such as Apache Service Mix5 or Sun’s OpenESB6 are
available. To put the outbound security module at client side and the inbound
security module at service side into practice, implementations of the WS-Security
standards provide appropriate ground work. Fig. 4 depicts the concept of a chain
of security handlers as it is implemented by WS-Security implementations such
as Axis27 or WSIT8. These handlers are conﬁgured to intercept the information
ﬂow at client and service side and conﬁgurably take care of security functionality
transparent to the business logic. Last but not least, the concept of in- and out-
interceptors in ESBs as depicted in Fig. 5 provides an applicable starting point
for implementing required functionality for security components No. 2 and No. 4
in Fig. 3. The Apache CXF binding componentfor JBI-based ESBs employs this
concept currently only for SOAP-based web services. From our current point of
view, propagation of this concept to other kinds of services should be possible.
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Provider EndpointConsumer Endpoint
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Fig. 5. ESB In- and Out-Interceptors
5 Related Work
VOs and enterprise networks as a dynamic, inter-enterprise conﬁguration for
sharing resources and competencies have been identiﬁed as a promising alter-
5 http://servicemix.apache.org/
6 https://open-esb.dev.java.net/
7 http://ws.apache.org/axis2/
8 https://wsit.dev.java.net/
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native by several authors such as [13], [10] and [3]. [15] stressed the issue of a
ﬂexible software and service selection and sourcing strategy while [17] partic-
ularly emphasized the short-term nature of virtual enterprises which conﬂicts
with time being the most important factor in the development of trust between
collaboration partners. As a result, novel ideas such as the trust negotiation and
authorization approach for VOs by [23] have been developed.
OASISpublished several standards such asWS-Security9,WS-SecurityPolicy10,
WS-Federation11 and WS-Trust12. However, all of them only deﬁne how to apply
security mechanisms to individual SOAP messages, rendering their application to
companies interested in opening their business processes – holding hundreds of
individual services, resulting in thousands of diﬀerent SOAP messages – a well-
engineered but too low-level technical basis for unreﬂected deployment.
Bertino et al. [6] discuss three essential classes of security services – identity
management, authentication and access control – in more detail and propose a
service-oriented approach to security. The service-oriented security architecture
presented by [20] considers the same services and bears a prototype based on an
ESB like our approach.
The FedWare federated identity management middleware service by [14] em-
ploys an external IdP as we do but instead of open standards they base their
approach on the Sun Java System Identity Manager. In contrast, the distributed
access control infrastructure by [5] does not employ an IdP and does not permit
user participation regarding transfer and usage of the access tokens. The web
service architecture for decentralized identity- and attribute-based access con-
trol by [12] considers many of these issues but is particularly tailored to web
services while our approach is open for all kinds of services due to mediation ca-
pabilities of ESBs. The security credential mapping approach by [2] introduces
a concept to mediate between diﬀerent credential formats such as X.509 certiﬁ-
cates, SAML and username tokens and Kerberos tickets, rendering this work
an oportune starting point for extending our IdP. Still this work is currently
determined to GRID services, only.
Several further authors such as [21] or [4] tackle usage and access control
in SOAs and VOs in particular mainly from a conceptual perspective, focusing
access control models and policy languages. Still inadequate understanding of
the security issues and potential solutions together with the false belief that
companies have to do costly investments into security infrastructures [11] impede
broad spreading.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper we have presented the architectural concept of a security infras-
tructure for dynamic service-oriented VOs. The presented approach aims at min-
9 http://www.oasis-open.org/specs/#wssv1.1
10 http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-securitypolicy
11 http://docs.oasis-open.org/wsfed/federation
12 http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-trust
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imizing the leadtime before usage of external services can start by employing a
security intermediary for mediation purposes. We primarily focus on access con-
trol but the overall architecture permits implementing further security functions
as well. We presented several architectural alternatives and the conceptual model
and architecture of our approach in detail and completed this work by prelim-
inary technical considerations towards the implementation of a ﬁrst prototype.
This prototype is then going to be evaluated within the Spike project.
Beyond that tentative prototype, current and future work covers detailing and
reﬁning several aspects of our approach. Access control to users’ security tokens
and attributes hosted at the IdP is not yet fully sorted out but an adapted
OAuth13 protocol seems to provide a promising approach. Furthermore, avail-
ability and absence of required access tokens might even be considered during
the selection phase of an adequate service instance just as other user deﬁned
service selection criteria such as service availability, price range, load or other
quality of service criteria. Last but not least even users’ ‘privacy attitude’, i.e.
which access tokens or which set of attributes are they willing to disclose for a
particular type of service, might be considered during the service selection phase
and necessitates further research.
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